

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03087 01 OF 02 091500Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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R 091405Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4865  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 3087

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR WB UR  
SUBJECT: BERLIN: RECENT EASTERN MEASURES, POSSIBLE WESTERN  
COUNTERMEASURES

REFS: (A) BONN A-38, (B) BERLIN 456, (C) STATE 40753

1. SUMMARY AND INTROUDCTION: REFTELS AND REFAIR PROVIDE  
EXCELLENT VIEWS OF THE BERLIN SITUATION ON WHICH WE WILL  
DRAW HEAVILY IN MAKING OUR COMMENTS. WE WILL DO SO  
WOTH THE CAVEAT THAT SOVIET MOTIVATIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS  
CLEARLY REVEALED WELL IN ADVANCE OF THEIR ACTIONS AND THAT  
PRECICIONS IN THIS FIELD ARE NEVER EASY. INDEED, A GOOD  
DEAL OF EXISTING WESTERN DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING BERLIN  
COME FROM CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF EASTERN MOTIVES  
AND RELATED DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT DESIRABLE WESTERN RESPONSES.  
WE DO CONSIDER THAT RECENT MOVES HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED  
BY SEVERAL OBJECTIVES AND,HENCE, THINK THAT  
WESTERN FORCEFUL RESPONSES SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CALCULATED TO  
RESPOND TO THE EASTERN MOVES WHICH DIRE TLY AFFECT ALLIED RIGHTS  
OR SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY. WE THINK THAT  
THOSE MOVES WHICH HAVE A LESS DIRECT IMPACT SHOULD BE RESPONDED  
TO MORE CAUTIOUSLY. END SUMMARY.

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2. SOVIET DESIDERATA IN BERLIN:  
WITHOUT TRYING TO WRITE THE BOTTOM LINE IN EVALUATING THE QA OF  
1971, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE USSR BOTH PAID A PRICE AND GAINED  
BENEFITS IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT. AS IS THEIR WONT, WE CAN EXPECT  
THEM TO TRY TO REDUCE THE VALUE OF THEIR CONCESSIONS ON "UNIMPEDED  
ACCESS," ON EXPANDED COMMUNICATONS AND ON CONTACT BETWEEN THE

WESTERN SECTORS AND EAST BERLIN AND THE GDR AS WELL FRG/BERLIN TIES. THEY WILL ALSO SEEK TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF WESTERN COUNTER-CONCESSION, SUCH AS THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL. WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO CONTINUE TO GIVE THE AGREEMENT THE MOST FAVORABLE--FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW--INTERPRETATION POSSIBLE, INCLUDING CAREFULLY GAUGED ACTIONS DESIGNED TO REINFORCE THAT INTERPRETATION. IN THE CASE OF THE QA, WHICH CONTAINS SOME ELEMENTS SUBJECT TO CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS, THE SOVIETS WILL PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THOSE GRAY AREAS (E.G. FRG-BERLIN TIES, REPRESENTATION OF WSB BY FRG, APPLICABILITY OF QA TO ESB) WHERE THEY CAN ACT WITHOUT CALLING INTO QUESTION THE QA ITSELF. THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS SOVIET RESTRAINT IS A REALIZATION THAT, IMPERFECT AS IT IS, THE QA SERVES A USEFUL ROLE IN THE OVERALL SCHEME OF EUROPEAN DETENTE AND ITS DEMISE WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN MANY OTHER MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVES. WITHIN THIS SELF IMPOSED LIMIT SOVIET ACTIONS IN BERLIN CAN BE SEEN TO BE MOTIVATED BY SEVERAL DISINCLINATIONS:

- TO CHIP AWAY AT THE EDGES OF ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN WHEREEVER POSSIBLE;
- TO UNDERMINE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, FRG TIES IN WEST BERLIN;
- TO STRENGTHEN GDR CLAIMS IN EAST BERLIN WHILE PROBABLY NOT GIVING THE GDR COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY;
- TO COUNTER SELECTIVELY BUT VIGOROUSLY WESTERN MOVES WHICH SOVIETS PERCEIVE TO BE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE DEVIATIONS FROM THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE QA;
- IN ANY EVENT, TO PROTEST ALL CASES OF WESTERN ACTIONS, HOWEVER MINOR, WHICH DEVIATE FROM SOVIET INTER-CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERPRETATION OF THE QA.  
HENCE WE SEE SOVIET MOVES TO BE A COMBINATION OF CAREFULLY CALCULATED INITIATIVES AND RESPONSES, WHICH CAN PROVIDE MULTIPLE BENEFITS.

3. THE RECENT MOVE:  
THE STEPS RECENTLY TAKEN IN EAST BERLIN (ITEMS C, D, E, F AND I IN PARA 4 OF BERLIN 456) APPEAR FROM HERE TO BE BASICALLY MOTIVATED BY THE SOVIETS' CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE FACT OF INTEGRATION OF WEST BERLIN INTO THE EC. THE EASTERN MOVES PARALLEL THE PERCEIVED WESTERN MOVES IN THAT THEY DO NOT YET AFFECT THE PRACTICE OF ALLIED RIGHTS IN EAST BERLIN AND CAN BE PORTRAYED BY THE SOVIETS AS UNIMPORTANT CHANGES. THIS, OF COURSE, IS PRECISELY WHAT WE TOLD THE SOVIETS IN REPLY TO THEIR PROTEST OVER THE EC PARLIAMENTARY INITIATIVE. (WE VIEW AS SUPPORTING EVIDENCE THE FACT THAT SINCE THE START OF THE NEW YEAR WHEN MOST OF THESE MEASURES TOOK EFFECT, SEVERAL LONG SOVIET PRESS

ITEMS ON BERLIN HAVE FAILED TO MENTION THE EC ISSUE,  
ALTHOUGH EARLIER ONES ALWAYS DID.) BUT THE EASTERN MOVES  
ALSO  
ALSO SERVED THE ADDITIONAL PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING GDR  
CLAIMS TO THE EXERCISE OF SOVERIGNTY OVER EAST BERLIN,  
WITHOUT, HOWEVER, GIVING THE GDR THE REAL SOVERIGNTY  
IT DESIRES.

4. OTHER RECENT MOVES (ITEMS G, H AND TWO MENTIONED  
IN J) SEEM TO US TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION IN THAT  
THEY APPEAR TO HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT ON ALLIED RIGHTS. (ITEM A  
DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE PART OF A CONCERTED POLICY OF  
INTERFERENCE, BUT RATHER A SHARP REACTION TO A SINGLE  
EVENT, THE CDU/CSU RALLY.) THE FACT THAT THE  
SOVIETS HAVE MOVED LESS CLEARLY AND MORE CAUTIOUSLY IN  
THESE INSTANCES SUGGESTS THAT THEY ALSO CONSIDER THEM TO  
BE MORE SERIOUS STEPS. IN EACH CASE THE SOVIETS CAN  
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REVERSE COURSE WITHOUT AN APPEARANCE OF BACKDOWN.

5. WE BELIEVE THE LATTER GROUP OF ACTIONS IS  
DESIGNED TO TEST WESTERN REACTIONS AND TO TAKE EVERY  
ADVANTAGE SHOULD THOSE REACTIONS BE LESS THAN DETERMINED.  
WE THEREFORE SEE CONSIDERABLE MERIT IN A CAREFULLY  
MEASURED WESTERN REACTION (OR REACTIONS) TO HEAD OFF  
ANY LOSSES TO THE ALLIES OVER THESE ISSUES.

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ACTION SS-25

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R 091405Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4866  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 3087

EXDIS

6. BERLINE 137 SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN FULLY INTERGRATING EAST BERLIN INTO THE GDR-- I.E., GIVING THE GDR FULL SOVIERIGNTY--WHILE ENCHANCING THIER ABILITY TO MEDDLE IN WEST BERLIN AFFAIRS. WHOLE THIS WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO GDR URGING, INOUR VIEW, IT WOULD POSE SEROUS PROBLEMS FOR SOVIETS. FIRST, BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE TO RECKON WITH THE PROBABILITY OF A WESTERN NEGATIVE REACTION WHICH COULD HAVE BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET DETENTE STRATEGY AND WHICH COULD LEAD TO COUNTERMEASURES MINIMIZING THEIR PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN. SECONDLY, A RESIDUAL DE FACTO ROLE IN EAST BERLIN SUPPLEMENTS THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY THUS PERMITTING USSR TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN GERMA AFFAIRS. HENCE, WE DOUBT THEY WOULD FULLY SURRENDER THE BERLIN LEVER TO THE GDR.

7. ALLIED RESPONSES;  
BEFORE THE ALLIES CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDED ACTIONS CONTAINED IN BERLIN 456, WE THINK SOME DIFFERENTIATION OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES ALONG LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE WOULD BE USEFUL SO THAT THE ALLIES' RESPONSE WOULD BE APPROPRIATELY DIRECTED AT THE RIGHT TARGET. IN THIS REGARD, IF WE INTERPRET BONN A-38 CORRECTLY, IT SUGGESTS THAT WE DEFINE  
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WHAT OUR RUBICON IS LEST WE ERRONEOUSLY VIEW EACH SOVIET MOVE AS A MAJOR TEST. WE SEE VALUE IN THIS APPROACH PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE ALLIES APPEAR LESS THAN FULLY UNITED ON THE MEANING OF SOVIET MOVES OR ON DESIRABLE WESTERN RESPONSES.

8. WE ARE NOT, HOWEVER, ARGUING THAT WE DO NOTHING UNTIL THE RUBICON IS REACHED. THE QEUSTION IS WHAT COUNTER MOVES BY THE WEST ARE MOST DESIRABLE TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT FURTHER INCURSIONS ARE DANGEROUS. OF THE PACKAGE OF MEASURES OUTLINED IN PARA 8 OF BERLIN 456 WE BELIEVE A OR F ARE POSSIBLE COUNTERMOVES TO SOVIET MOVES, HOWEVER TENTATIVE, WHICH THREATEN BASIC ALLIED RIGHTS IN GREATER BERLIN OR SEROUSLY IMPAIR THE VIABILITY OF THE WSB (I.E., THE SECOND SET OF ACTIONS). WE ARE PERSUADED ON THE BASIS OF CRITERIA TWO AND THREE OF BONN A-38 (APAGES 7-8) THAT BERLIN'S RECOMMENDATIONS B AND D WOULD LEAVE THE WEST OPE TO CHARGES OF VIOLATING ITS OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE QA. MOVES C AND E MAY BE DESIRABLE IF --AND ONLY IF--THEY ARE CAREFULLY MEASURED TO MEET THE EASTERN MOVES WITHOUT PROVOKING ADDITIONAL COUNTERMOVES.

9. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE BELIEVE THAT ALLIED ACTIONS TO HEAD OFF FURTHER SOVIET MOVES TO STRENGTHEN GDR CLAIMS TO SOVIERIGNTY IN EAST BERLIN MUST TAKE A MORE GENERAL TACK. HERE THE SITUATIONIS ANALOGOUS TO THE SOVIET POSITION ONTHE EC INTEGRATION ISSUE: WE CAN PRTEST THE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP, BUT CAN DO LITTLE TO STOP IT AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT INTERFEREWITH THE EXERCISE OF ALLIED RIGHTS. FORTUNITELY, THE VERY EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS INSURE THAT THE SOVIETS, WHAT- EVER THEY SAY TO THE GDR, CANNOT TURN OVER FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO THE GDR WITHOUT RISKING A MAJOR CONFRONTATION.

10. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ALLIED PERMISSION OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST BERLIN'S CONFIDENTIAL

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TIES TO THE FRG AND EC, AND SOVIET INTEGRATION OF EAST BERLIN INTO THE GDR. THE ALLIES DO NOT CLAIN A RIGHT TO COMPLETE THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND, IN FACT, ASSURE THE SOVIET UNION THAT WE WILL NOT PERMIT INTEGRATION TO INTERFER WITH ALLIED RIGHTS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ASSERT THE RIGHT OF EAST BERLIN TOBE FULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE GDR, ALTHOUGH IN PRACTIVE THEY STOP SHORT OF COMPLETE INTEGRATION, WHILE ASSURING US THA T THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE EXISITNG SITUATION. THUS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT ANY STEPS TO INTEGRATE EAST BERLIN INTO THE GDR THREATEN ALLIED RIGHTS (WHICH SOVIETS VERBALLY DENY WHILE IN PRACTICE PERMIT), THE WEST SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN TO THE SOVIETS AND THE GDR THAT SUCH MOVES, EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT AND CANNOT DIRECTLY AFFECT ALLIED RIGHTS, ARE DANGEROUS AND WILL HAVE A COSTLY AND HARMFUL EFFECT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. (STATE 40753, INDICATES THAT THIS IS BEING DONE AT A HIGH LEVEL.)

11. FINALLY, AT THE RIST OF REITERATING WHAT SEEMS TO BE STATED OR IMPLIED IN ALL THREE REFERENCES, WE LOOK UPON BERLIN AS AN EXPOSED WESTERN POSITION IN WHICH ALLIED ACTIONS ARE LIMITED BY THE NEED FOR A BASICALLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND THE INABILITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIES TO AGREE FULLY ON TACTICS. TOON

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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE BERLIN  
**Type:** TE  
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